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ABSTRACT 
There is an obvious need for performance measurement in U. S. Navy 
commands.  Not only are performance metrics, or measurements, essential to 
tracking progress toward strategic goals, but as a publicly funded entity and 
holder of the public trust, the Navy has an obligation to efficiently and effectively 
use those public funds.  Performance metrics are the guideposts to achieving 
efficiency and effectiveness.  This thesis was designed to aid the Program 
Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems, a Navy Echelon II acquisition 
command, with a performance measurement project, deriving metrics for two of 
its seven major programs, IWS 1.0 and 2.0.  Performance drivers were captured 
through interviews with key leaders in those two major programs.  Those 
interviews were transformed into causal performance maps which depicted the 
interplay of the drivers and the outcomes they influenced.  Performance metrics 
were then derived for those drivers and outcomes and arranged in a balanced 
scorecard format.  The scorecards may be useful to the major program 
managers in monitoring the progress of their organizations toward achieving 
strategic success.  Additionally, the metrics should enhance understanding of 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Performance measurement came to the forefront of federal agency 
consciousness with the passage of the Government Performance and Results 
Act of 1993 by the United States Congress.  President Bush and President 
Clinton before him both emphasized improved efficiency and effectiveness in the 
federal government through strategic planning and performance measurement.  
Controlling and measuring performance in the attainment of strategic objectives 
is an essential part of the Navy’s plan to improve its capabilities over the long 
run.  
Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) is a 
Navy Echelon III command involved in the acquisition of shipboard weapon 
systems.  The primary role of PEO IWS personnel is to shepherd and manage 
weapon systems through the programming and acquisition process; they do not 
physically produce the weapon systems themselves.  As such PEO IWS 
depends almost wholly on the experience and capability of its manpower; it is a 
knowledge based organization.   
The command was established in 2003 in order to 
…Provide the required discipline and coordination of the 
architecture and overarching interface principles to which our 
systems will be developed.  This PEO will be responsible for all 
surface ship and submarine combat systems, missiles (except 
TRIDENT and TOMAHAWK), radars, launchers (except TRIDENT), 
EW and gun systems.  This PEO will combine the combat systems 
software programs from the present PEO Subs, Carriers, TSC, 
EXW and Surface Strike.  This PEO will also be responsible for 
coordinating all ASW warfare area programs across PEOs.  ASW 
software development, including the annual submarine combat 
systems software update, will migrate to PEO IWS, facilitating 
optimal development of ASW software across platforms.  PEO 
Subs will continue as the complimentary buy and build organization 
for the supporting components and torpedoes.   
   This realignment changes our focus from the current platform 
centered approach to a more integrated approach across all 
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combat systems.  As the Navy moves to open systems 
architectures and highly integrated systems of systems, it is critical 
that those efforts have a strong, consistent focus.   
(Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy 2003) 
The command’s creation was in response to the Chief of Naval 
Operations’ vision for optimal alignment of Navy organizations in order to 
successfully implement his strategy embodied in SEA POWER 21.  PEO IWS 
was faced with the real challenge of combining entities from five different 
commands, with five different cultures, into an effective single organization.   This 
required the creation of an organizational structure, infrastructure, processes, 
and systems for achieving its mission.  Another part of that organizational design 
challenge was creating a useful performance measurement system that could be 
used to indicate their progress toward strategic goals. 
PEO IWS was subsequently organized around seven major program 
areas.  These major programs, known as IWS 1.0 through IWS 7.0 are listed 
below. 
• IWS 1.0 Integrated Combat Systems 
• IWS 2.0 Above Water Sensors 
• IWS 3.0 Surface Ship Weapons 
• IWS 4.0 International Programs 
• IWS 5.0  Undersea Systems 
• IWS 6.0 Command and Control (Networks/Excomm) 
• IWS 7.0 Naval Open Architecture 
Performance measurement is a crucial tool to the major program 
managers within PEO IWS.  If implemented properly, it has the potential to 
answer two questions of significant importance: 
• Are we doing the right things? 






The purpose of this thesis was to observe strategy, goals and operations 
at PEO IWS 1.0 and 2.0 with the aim of recommending performance metrics that 
might be useful for the major program managers in determining how well their 
organizations are meeting their strategic objectives.  IWS 1.0 and 2.0 were 
studied, and after analysis of collected data, recommended performance metrics 
were suggested.   
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. Primary Research Question 
• What are useful performance metrics for PEO IWS 1.0 and 2.0? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What are the vision, mission, and strategy of PEO IWS and its 
chain of command? 
• What current performance metrics are being utilized by IWS 1.0 
and IWS 2.0? 
• What guidance does the Navy leadership give regarding 
performance measurement? 
 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
1. PEO IWS 1.0 and 2.0 
This thesis is limited to the two aforementioned major program areas at 
PEO IWS.  These two major programs may have much in common with other 
major programs at IWS and within the Navy, but the thrust of this effort was to 
evaluate these two entities only. 
2. Strategic Goals 
The recommendations herein are limited to measures of effectiveness and 
efficiency in achieving strategic goals.  It is possible to drill down to lower and 
lower levels of an organization, and create more specific and tactically oriented 
metrics.  Measures are limited to those appropriate for the major program 




While there are many individuals and organizations with a stake in the 
outcome of the work performed by PEO IWS 1.0 and 2.0, this thesis was written 
from the perspective that its primary users would be the major program 
managers of those two units.   
4. Limitations 
Limitations imposed by distance have made close interaction more difficult 
than if the author had been collocated with PEO IWS.  Additionally, the author’s 
limited experience with Navy acquisition undoubtedly will surface occasionally in 
this thesis.   
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis attempted to derive useful performance metrics by leveraging 
the personal knowledge of IWS 1.0 and 2.0 leaders and managers, as well as 
leading literature in the field of performance measurement. 
1. Tacit Knowledge 
There are different sources for deriving what is important to the success of 
an organization.  The primary source chosen for this thesis was to tap into 
organizational managers’ tacit knowledge, or that knowledge known to the 
individual, but not usually recorded anywhere.  Individuals may or may not realize 
the depth of their expertise, or the intricacy to which they understand their own 
organizations.  Individuals’ tacit knowledge, based primarily on experience and 
education, can provide a significant source of information about the 
organization’s performance, particularly in knowledge-based organizations like 
PEO IWS (Ambrosini and Bowman 2002).   
2. Interviews 
Interviews were used to extract tacit knowledge from leadership within 
IWS 1.0 and 2.0.  In accord with Spradley’s The Ethnographic Interview (1979), 
questioning was conducted as informally as possible, with the hope of building a 
rapport with interview subjects so that maximum cooperation might be obtained.   
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The ultimate goal was to allow interview subjects to express what they saw as 
the drivers of performance within IWS 1.0 and 2.0 through observations, stories, 
and anecdotes. 
3. Causal Performance Maps 
The performance drivers and linkages among them were identified in each 
interview.  Interview data were then translated into cognitive maps known as 
causal performance maps.  A cognitive map is a representation of an individual’s 
knowledge, experience, and point of view (Ambrosini and Bowman 2002).  A 
causal map attempts to visually portray the cause and effect relationships among 
performance factors that affect a desired outcome.   
4. Performance Metrics 
After causal performance maps were created, reviewed, and edited by 
interview subjects, critical performance variables were identified and metrics 
were derived based on past research and performance measurement literature.  
Additionally, interview subjects were asked to give their recommendations for 
useful metrics. 
 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Following this introduction, Chapter II reviews leading research in the field 
of performance measurement.  Chapter III presents collected data in the form of 
PEO IWS and Navy-wide strategic objectives and vision and causal performance 
maps.  An analysis of the collected data is offered in Chapter IV, Chapter V 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. WHY BE CONCERNED WITH PERFORMANCE MEASUEMENT? 
1. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)  
In January 1993, Congress passed GPRA in order to:  
(1) improve the confidence of the American people in the 
capability of the Federal Government, by systematically 
holding Federal agencies accountable for achieving program 
results; 
(2) initiate program performance reform with a series of pilot 
projects in setting program goals, measuring program 
performance against those goals, and reporting publicly on 
their progress; 
(3) improve Federal program effectiveness and public 
accountability by promoting a new focus on results, service 
quality, and customer satisfaction; 
(4) help Federal managers improve service delivery, by 
requiring that they plan for meeting program objectives and by 
providing them with information about program results and 
service quality; 
(5) improve congressional decision-making by providing more 
objective information on achieving statutory objectives, and on 
the relative effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs 
and spending; and 
(6) improve internal management of the Federal Government. 
(Government Performance and Results Act 1993) 
Additionally, GPRA required that federal agencies incorporate and report to 
Congress the results of their strategic planning, including a mission statement, 
outcome-related goals and objectives, an analysis of how the goals and 
objectives would be achieved, and a description of how performance goals relate 
to strategic goals and objectives.  Since public organizations do not operate to 
maximize profits, much of the efficiency derived from competitive markets was 
generally not being observed in federal agencies.  Congress was attempting to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness by mandating practices that were common 
in private-sector enterprises, while also increasing the accountability of public 
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agencies.  Performance measurement against strategic goals and objectives was 
deemed a key ingredient in improving public agency performance. 
2. President Bush’s Management Agenda 
In his fiscal year (FY) 2002 Management Agenda, President Bush 
articulated management improvements that he sought to execute throughout the 
federal government.  These improvements were to be “results oriented” and to 
“achieve immediate, concrete, and measurable results.”  Additionally, it was 
stated that subsequent goals would be undertaken as “tangible improvements 
are made.”  The President planned to formally integrate performance review with 
budget decisions, stipulate that agencies pinpoint outcome measures and 
accurately monitor the progress of their programs, and that the entire Executive 
Branch management become more performance-oriented.  It was very evident 
that the President’s agenda could not be achieved without robust and accurate 
performance measurement.   
3. Department of the Navy 
Performance measurement is a significant tool in the Secretary of the 
Navy’s plan for improving efficiency and effectiveness within the Navy.  It was a 
major theme in the Secretary’s FY 2006/2007 budget submission to the 
Secretary of Defense, comprising nearly one-tenth of the total verbiage.  In his 
“Principles of Leadership,” the Secretary encourages Navy leaders to 
“incorporate measures and metrics everywhere.” (England 2003).   
Likewise, the Chief of Naval Operations specifically mentioned metrics 
thirteen different times in his “Guidance for 2005,” his specific vision and goals 
disseminated to the entire Navy.  The implication is that the Navy has specific 
strategic goals, and it cannot tell how well it is achieving those goals without 
specifically measuring its performance.    
 
B. CYBERNETIC FEEDBACK MODEL 
One of the most basic models of organizational function is the inputs-
process-outputs model.  In this model, organizational functions are broken down 
into inputs to the process, processes that perform some transformation of the 
inputs, and outputs that are the result of the transformation. The organization 
exists to produce outputs.  The leaders and members of the organization direct 
their efforts to the transformation of inputs for the delivery of outputs. 
 
Figure 1.   Inputs-Process-Outputs Model (From: Simons 2000) 
 
A significant improvement on this model is the cybernetic feedback model.  
The cybernetic feedback model incorporates a standard or expectation for the 
output and a feedback loop.  The standard allows the organization to define an 
acceptable output and the feedback loop indicates to leadership whether the 
processes are producing outputs that meet the predefined standard.  This 
comparison of output versus an expectation is the hallmark of performance 
measurement systems.  Variance from the standard is fed back to members and 
leaders of the organization so that they can alter inputs and processes in an 
attempt to better meet the standard.  Thus, the goal of performance 
measurement is to direct and control organizational energy toward a desired 
outcome through systematic measurement. 
 




C. THE NATURE OF PERFORMANCE METRICS 
Modern researchers (Kaplan and Norton 1996, Lynch and Cross 1995, 
Simons 2000, Malina and Selto 2001) have taken a detailed look at performance 
measurement systems, both their derivations and characteristics, over the last 
three decades.  Some of the common themes that emerge from the research of 
the last decade include: 
1.  Performance metrics should be linked to strategy. 
2. Performance metrics should be focused on what is important to the 
success of the organization 
3.  Effective metrics have common traits. 
4.  Targets should provide actionable feedback to leadership and 
organizational members. 
5.  Performance measurement should integrate and unify the 
organization. 
1. Strategic Orientation 
Performance metrics should provide a snapshot of organizational 
execution relative to strategy; they should reflect progress toward achieving the 
organization’s game plan (Lynch and Cross 1995).  Long-term, strategic focus is 
easily overlooked within federal agencies, including the Department of the 
Defense, due to the short-term nature of funding profiles, to obligation and 
expenditure rates reviewed multiple times during the year, and to the immediacy 
interjected by unplanned contingencies.  A reactive mindset can become 
engrained due to short-notice reporting requirements regarding financial standing 
and organizational accomplishments (Lynch and Cross 1995).  Appropriate 
metrics should help maintain a strategic focus in the midst of a volatile operating 
environment.   
2. Critical Performance Variables 
In designing performance metrics, organizations must focus on what is 
imperative to their strategic success, to the exclusion of things that are not 
important.  These important elements are known as critical performance 
variables (CPV).  Getting the CPVs right is arguably the most important part of 
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determining useable performance metrics.  The adage, “What gets measured 
gets managed,” applies.  If what is truly important to strategic success is not 
measured, and less important factors are, then the result will be the diversion of 
management attention toward the less significant factors.  One way to determine 
CPVs is to visualize where the organization wants to be five years hence, and if 
at that time the organization’s strategy had failed, what factors would have led to 
that failure.  The factors that were important enough to have caused the strategy 
to fail are CPVs (Simons 2000).   
Performance metrics should have a long-term perspective and be 
indicative of how the organization provides value to its customers.  They should 
be balanced and focused on more than just products and financial outcomes by 
including non-financial measures (Lynch and Cross 1995, Kaplan and Norton 
1996, Simons 2000).  If all aspects of the strategy are not measured, only those 
parts that are measured are likely to get significant management attention.  
Balance is particularly important for knowledge-based organizations like PEO 
IWS because intellectual capital is not captured well in financial metrics.  Kaplan 
and Norton identify four perspectives for balance:    
• Financial Perspective - the economic impact of decisions 
• Customer Perspective - factors that are critical to customers 
remaining loyal and satisfied 
• Business-Internal-Processes Perspective - internal processes that 
are critical to the organization achieving its strategic objectives 
• Learning and Growth Perspective - identifies the infrastructure 
(people, systems, and procedures) that will enable long-term 
growth and continuous improvement 
Performance metrics should not only reflect the CPVs; they should be 
causally linked and mutually reinforcing (Kaplan and Norton 1996).  The CPVs 
can be thought of as the organization’s story of success.  Kaplan and Norton sum 
it up by emphasizing the importance of focusing on drivers of future performance: 
the cause-and-effect variables, which link actions to outcomes.  Performance 
metrics can measure CPVs or the desired outcomes themselves.  This will result  
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in either leading or lagging indicators of success, respectively.  A mix of the two 
is desirable (Kaplan and Norton 1996).  Simons further commented on factors 
involved in choosing what to measure. 
• Measure inputs when it is impossible to measure processes or 
outputs, when the cost of inputs is high relative to outputs, and 
when quality and safety is important. 
• Measure processes when they are observable and measurable, the 
cost of measuring them is low, standardization is critical, cause and 
effect relationships are understood, and it can result in strategic 
advantage. 
• Measure outputs when they are observable and measurable, cost 
of measuring them is low, cause and effect relationships are not 
well understood, and freedom to innovate is desired. 
Choosing the right thing to measure can save time, effort and money. 
3. Desired Characteristics of Performance Metrics 
Regardless of what is measured, the metrics should share some common 
characteristics.  They should be actionable, measuring items that are within the 
manager’s ability to influence.  The information provided by metrics should be 
accurate and unambiguous.  Metrics should capture the essence of a CPV.  
Simon’s summed up the attributes of a good measure; it should be objective, 
complete, and responsive. 
• Objective – quantifiable and measurable with confidence in 
accuracy. 
• Complete – capture all relevant data in a manner that is 
understandable to users. 
• Responsive – actionable by managers and leaders; within their 
sphere of influence. 
Another way to think of the attributes of a good performance metric is with 
the acronym SMART (Harbour 1997).  
• S – specific 
• M – measurable 
• A – actionable 
• R – relevant  
• T – timely 
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This list introduces the concept of time.  Timeliness can be critical to the impact 
of a manager’s actions.  If a situation requires immediate attention, but the 
manager does not become aware of the variance from the performance standard 
until 30 days later, that is problematic.  Those are 30 days of potentially wasted 
organizational effort moving in an unintended direction.     
4. Tool for Management Action 
Performance metrics are nothing if not a mechanism for management 
action.  To function in this manner, metrics must be compared to some 
benchmark to indicate progress.  As indicated by the cybernetic feedback model, 
the metric is compared against the standard to provide feedback to improve 
inputs or processes.  Performance measurement provides a systematic process 
for tracking progress and making midcourse corrections; a regular opportunity for 
strategic review (Lynch and Cross 1995, Kaplan and Norton 1996).  Because 
metrics focus on things management can influence, they direct attention toward 
what can be improved and away from what is beyond the manager’s control.  
Feedback, particularly when communicated throughout an organization, provides 
an excellent chance for organizational learning and improvement.  In that way, a 
well-designed measurement and feedback system can be the catalyst for 
continuous improvement and strategic development. 
Appropriate performance metrics should help an organization achieve a 
higher return on management (ROM) (Simons 2000).  ROM is equivalent to the 
amount of organizational energy released divided by the amount of management 
time expended.  The goal of good performance measurement would be to allow 
leadership to manage by exception when practical, so that they can focus energy 
on issues and processes that need their continual expert attention.  By allowing 
business processes to operate without continual management attention, the 
denominator of the ROM ratio is minimized, thus increasing the value of ROM.   
5. Performance Metrics as Organizational Unifiers 
By integrating metrics derived from strategy, the performance 
measurement system can effectively communicate the chosen strategy 
throughout the organization, align and link individual, department and corporate 
14 
goals, and identify and align strategic initiatives (Lynch and Cross 1995, Kaplan 
and Norton 1996).  The right metrics should let employees see how their actions 
contribute to the performance of the whole organization (Lynch and Cross 1995).  
Individual employee connection to the entire organization’s performance should 
act as a motivator, particularly when overall performance benefits individuals, 
uniting the organization around strategic goals.  The performance measurement 
system serves to coordinate resources throughout the organization in line with 
corporate vision, potentially reducing redundancy and improving effectiveness 
and efficiency.  When coupled with a good internal communication system, it also 
provides an opportunity for bottom-up strategic feedback from the elements of 
the organization that are frequently in closest contact with the customers.  
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III. COLLECTED DATA 
A. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
One of the primary factors that might influence the success of a 
performance measurement system is how well metrics are linked to strategy.  In 
order to arrive at performance metrics for IWS 1.0 and 2.0, the strategic 
environment in which they operate must be understood.  PEO IWS reports 
directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and 
Acquisition) (ASN (R,D&A)) in acquisition matters, and to the Commander, Naval 
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) for matters pertaining to in service support 
(Department of the Navy 1995).  NAVSEA subsequently reports to ASN (RD&A) 
and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).  ASN (RD&A) and the CNO report to 
the Secretary of the Navy. 
1. The Secretary of the Navy 
The Secretary’s strategic goals were spelled out in the Department of the 
Navy’s FY 2006/2007 budget submission to the Secretary of Defense.  They 
include maintaining a ready and sustainable force to meet today’s challenge, 
investing in tomorrow’s capabilities, and establishing processes and 
organizations that make effective and efficient use of our scarce resources.  
These goals are supported through four pillars of effective military power.   
• People 
• Combat Capability 
• Technology Insertion 
• Improved Business Practices 
2. Chief of Naval Operations  
The CNO has five stated strategic objectives in his 2005 guidance to the 
Fleet. 
• Win the Global War on Terror (GWOT). 
• Improve readiness for global response. 
• Integrate Sea Strike, Shield Basing and FORCEnet into the Joint 
Force. 
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• Capture funds through Sea Enterprise to recapitalize the Navy. 
• Develop the 21st century workforce. 
He also has five long standing strategic priorities which have shaped the Navy 
during his tenure.   
• Current readiness 
• Future readiness 
• Alignment 
• Quality of service 
• Manpower. 
3. Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and 
Acquisition) (ASN (RD&A)) 
The ASN (RD&A) guidance for 2004 included the following strategic 
objectives (PEO IWS 2005). 
• Improve warfighter satisfaction 
• Shape and train an effective acquisition workforce 
• Lower total ownership cost of equipment and services 
• Reduce cost and cycle time 
• Accept responsibility as stewards of the national interest 
• Personally change and improve the neighborhood every day! 
• Consider all solutions – high tech to simple, commercial-off-the-
shelf to military, U. S. to international  
4. Naval Sea Systems Command 
The NAVSEA guidance for 2005 contained the following objectives. 
• Human capital strategy – continue to refine and implement 
• Lean Implementation Plan – strive for efficiency while improving 
effectiveness 
• Capture Cost Reduction – capture cost savings from increased 
efficiency to return to corporate Navy and customer accounts 
• Improve and Measure Productivity  
• Virtual SYSCOM 
5. PEO IWS 
PEO IWS identified areas for strategic success during strategic planning 
meetings at the beginning of FY 2005 (PEO IWS 2005). 
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• Personnel – optimum staffing, quality of work force, quality of life for 
employees, and refine human capital and horizontal integration 
strategies 
• Programmatic – accurately manage cost, schedule, 
technical/performance, and risk and achieve success in 
development of Open Architecture, CGX Radar, and Active Missile 
• Business – proactively manage all aspects of the budget process 
• Fleet Readiness – support the ultimate customer 
Figures 3 and 4 depict the goals and perspectives listed above in 
alignment from SECNAV down through PEO IWS.  PEO IWS is depicted in its 
two separate chains of commands.  If performance metrics within PEO IWS 1.0 
and 2.0 are to contribute to organizational success and mission accomplishment, 
it is important that they support PEO IWS strategy and the other strategies in 
their chain of command.  In this way the actions at the major program level within 
PEO IWS should impact the entire enterprise strategy in a positive manner.   It is 
apparent that the different strategic objectives are aligned and support one 
another in achieving the ultimate goal of effective military power.  The lines 



























































Figure 3.   Strategic Alignment of PEO IWS Perspectives 
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B. PEO IWS 1.0 AND 2.0 MISSION AND FUNCTION 
The primary mission for PEO IWS is to provide the United States Navy 
technically superior warfighting capability to take the fight to the enemy and win.  
Within PEO IWS, IWS 1.0 and 2.0 contribute to the accomplishment of that 
mission by providing top-quality integrated combat systems and above water 
sensors, respectively.  Neither IWS 1.0 nor 2.0 physically produce weapon 
systems.  Instead, they contract both Navy engineering field activities and private 
defense contractors to produce those systems.  IWS 1.0 and 2.0 provide “cradle 
to grave” service to the warfighter from concept refinement through system 
disposal to ensure the Fleet has the needed weapons systems to execute their 
missions. 
With that in mind, three middle to upper level leaders/managers at both 
IWS 1.0 and 2.0 were interviewed with the goal of defining what success looked 
like for their organizations, and also determining what factors influenced 
achieving that vision of success.  An attempt was made to avoid leading 
questions in an effort to let the interviews reflect the feelings of the interview 
subjects alone.  From those initial interviews, causal performance maps were 
constructed for each interview.  Those maps were then presented to the 
interview subjects to modify as they felt necessary to best tell their story of how 
to achieve organizational success.  Through this process of interview and 
subsequent refinement, causal performance maps became more accurate from 
the perspective of individual interview subjects.  The interview subjects were not 
asked to critique each others’ inputs, only to concentrate on their own 
perspectives as to what were the drivers of success for their major program area. 
Subsequent to the editing of individual maps, one composite map was 
developed for IWS 1.0 and one for IWS 2.0.  This was done by combining the 
separate maps within each major program area.  Where differences existed 
between maps, an attempt was made to resolve the difference through further 
communication with the interview subjects.  If consensus was not feasible then 
both versions were included in the composite map.  Since these maps are to be 
used to derive recommended useful performance metrics, it was important to 
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capture multiple points of view to get as whole a picture as practicable.  Some 
consolidation of similar variables was required to make the maps less cluttered 
and more comprehensible, but effort was made to maintain the intent of the 
original subjects’ maps.   
 
C. INTERVIEWS 
Six subjects within IWS 1.0 and 2.0, three from each major program, were 
selected to be interviewed based on their broad acquisition experience.  The six 
subjects had a total of 112 years of either military or acquisition experience.  
Additionally, all were in positions within IWS 1.0 and IWS 2.0 to have detailed 
knowledge of both strategic direction and day-to-day operations.  Five of the 
subjects were Government Service employees and one was a Naval Officer.  
Due to demands of the individual subjects’ work and travel schedules, and 
limitations in the author’s availability to travel, two of the subjects were initially 
interviewed together.  Those two were subsequently asked to critique the 
resultant causal performance map independently.   
The subjects were interviewed using the protocol depicted in Table 1.  
They were asked to define what desired outcomes translated into organizational 
success for IWS 1.0 or 2.0, respectively.  The interview subjects were next asked 
to lead the author through the chain of cause and effect processes and inputs 
that would result in the previously identified desired outcomes.  The subjects’ 
responses were then analyzed to identify the significant variables that would 
influence the desired outcomes.  Those variables and how they interact with one 









1. Record time, place, and identity of interviewee. 
2. Indicate that the interviewee will remain anonymous and record consent to 
being recorded.  
3. Could you describe your current position and work at IWS? 
4. What is the mission of IWS 2.0 (or 1.0, as appropriate)? 
5. Does your unit have overall goals? 
6. Please describe what would be considered a good performance outcome for 
your unit?   
7. If you could tell a story about how your unit can succeed, what would that 
story be like?  Can you tell that story? 
8. What factors are most important in determining whether your unit meets its 
goals, achieves good performance, or meets performance targets? Possible 
follow-up examples: 
 A. People investments (training, education, etc) 
 B. Financial efficiency (Waste) 
 C. Technical performance of new systems (Quality) 
 D. Supportability of new system 
 E. Delivery of new systems (Delivery) 
 F. Time efficiency, time to complete tasks (Cycle time) 
9. Are these factors linked in any way? 
10. Can these factors be measured? 
11. Would any of these measure help you manage your organization any better 
to achieve success? 
12. Now look out five years, are any other factors critical to IWS’ success? 
13. Who are your unit’s customers, internal and external? 
14. Do you get feedback on their satisfaction? 
15. What is the biggest indicator of failure for IWS? 




1. Causal Performance Maps 
The maps that resulted from the interviews with IWS 1.0 and 2.0 subjects 
are depicted in Figures 5 through 11.  The interview subjects are identified as 
Subjects A through F for the purpose of anonymity.  Outcomes, the definition of 
success, appear on the right side of each diagram with factors that lead to that 
outcome appearing to the left.  Arrows show the causal links between inputs, 
processes, and outcomes.  Double-headed arrows indicate that factors influence 
each other.  Terminology has been standardized to the maximum extent without 
disturbing the intent of the interview subjects.    
Figure 7 is a composite map for IWS 1.0 derived from combining the 
causal performance maps of the different IWS 1.0 subjects.  Figure 11 is the 
composite map for IWS 2.0.  The maps can be difficult to interpret, largely due to 
the many lines indicating causal relationships.  One of the main take-aways, 
which are relatively easier to identify, are the CPVs themselves.  As stated 
earlier, getting the CPVs right can be one of the most difficult parts of 
determining performance metrics.  It should be noted that some variables from 
the individual maps have been combined to enhance the readability of the 
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Figure 7.   Causal Performance Map – IWS 1.0 Composite 
 
a. IWS 1.0  
(1) Outcomes.  Figures 5 through 7 are relevant to IWS 
1.0, with Figure 6 being the map produced for two interview subjects who were 
interviewed together.  The outcomes that defined success were slightly different 
for the two maps, but both included the military acquisition standards of cost, 
schedule, and technical performance.  Of note, supportability of deployed 
systems was viewed as a subset of technical performance within IWS 1.0.  
Additionally, they indicated it was critical to maintain the funding stream for 
current programs.  If the major program manager, IWS 1.0, could end a 
hypothetical period with all programs on schedule, on budget, meeting technical/ 
performance requirements, and have a secure source of funding that would be a 
successful outcome from the perspective of those interviewed.   
Subject A also included the improvement of the IWS 1.0 
team as a successful outcome.  The subject alluded to the importance of the 
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professional ability of people within the organization.  There was also a concern 
about the future retirement of many PEO IWS employees and a need to maintain 
a continuous recruitment and development program within the organization to 
alleviate any loss in organizational capability from retirements. 
Subject C added an important topic, customer satisfaction.  
His comments mostly concerned Fleet users of IWS 1.0’s ultimate product, 
integrated combat systems.  Customer satisfaction is recognized in all the 
previously mentioned literature as the key to survivability and growth in private 
sector organizations (Lynch and Cross 1995, Kaplan and Norton 1996, Simons 
2000).   The fact that subject C mentioned it recognized that it is important to the 
perceived success of IWS 1.0, as well.  The fact that it was not mentioned 
specifically by subjects A or B does not mean that it is insignificant, only that it 
was not specifically mentioned.   
(2)  Processes.  Significant processes brought out by the 
interview subjects included: communication, teamwork, weapon system design, 
contract design, contractor performance, and financial management.  All 
recognized the importance of human capital, as well, but subject A gave it much 
more emphasis and included it not only as an input, but also within processes.  
Additionally, subjects B and C gave more emphasis to program planning and test 
and evaluation’s (T&E) impact on ultimate outcomes of the organization 
Communication is a key process that ultimately impacts all of 
IWS 1.0’s outcomes.  As interview subject C put it, it is a basic requirement that 
underlies all planning and execution within the organization.  It includes 
communication within IWS 1.0, between IWS 1.0 and the rest of PEO IWS, and 
communication with all stakeholders outside PEO IWS.   
Teamwork is closely linked with communication.  It concerns 
internal teamwork within the separate facets of IWS 1.0, external teamwork 
within the rest of PEO IWS, and external teamwork with outside stakeholders.  
Teamwork also encompasses cooperation between separate private contractors 
which can be problematic because of their concerns about proprietary knowledge 
and maintaining competitive advantage.  IWS 1.0 is the lead major program for 
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integrating the separate parts within PEO IWS by virtue of its mission to provide 
integrated combat systems to the fleet.  By the nature of its work it must link the 
efforts of the other major programs within PEO IWS into a useful, total system for 
the warfighter.  Integration of separate processes is at the forefront of military 
acquisition as noted by the emphasis on integrated product and process 
development (IPPD) in the Defense Acquisition Handbook..  IPPD emphasizes a 
multidisciplinary approach to problem solving and meeting customer and 
stakeholder needs. 
Human capital development is an important aspect of 
organizational growth which has impacts throughout IWS 1.0’s processes and 
outcomes.  Not only does it impact the obvious capability of employees, but also 
feeds back to recruitment and retention.  Current and future employees are likely 
to be motivated to work for an organization that allows them to improve their 
abilities and skill sets, regardless of the organization’s motive in offering that 
opportunity.  
Financial management recognizes that IWS 1.0 needs to 
intelligently manage its funding to deliver on its mission; sustainable funding is a 
key enabler of success.  The negative consequences from poor financial 
management are cost overruns, schedule slippage, and rescission of funds by 
higher authority.   
Contract design implies that the type of contract is important 
to contractor performance and T&E success.  Subject A emphasized the need to 
incentivize the provider of service to meet cost, schedule and 
technical/performance milestones, as well as to be integrated with other 
contractors.  The first three of those topics are already well incorporated within 
the acquisition communities contracting process.  They are largely driven by 
technological maturity and by a determination of which party to the contract will 
bear the risks of overruns and performance failure.  Regarding degree of 
integration, subject A emphasized that contractors could be financially motivated 
to interact well with other defense contractors working on a program to ensure 
the program met all of its goals.  Specifically, at least part of any incentive bonus 
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would be paid only if all involved contractors met their goals.  Thus, contractors 
would be encouraged to help one another and work together in a truly integrated 
program.   
Weapon system design is influenced by the degree of 
teamwork, communication, skill of the personnel involved, and specificity of the 
stated requirements.  As stated earlier, the IPPD process is significant and 
emphasizes knowledgeable personnel from multiple disciplines working together 
in an open manner to develop the best design within stated parameters.  
Subjects B and C included it within the more encompassing heading of program 
planning. 
Contractor performance, according to interview subjects, is 
not fully within the major program manager’s direct control, but is certainly within 
his or her influence.  In a large sense, one of the primary responsibilities of 
acquisition organizations in the military is to influence contractor performance.  
Much of that influence is brought about by the previously mentioned processes: 
communication, teamwork, specificity of the contract, and a good system design.   
Subjects B and C indicated that program planning plays a 
key role in the ultimate outcomes of the organization.  That planning included, but 
was not limited to, acquisition strategy, maintenance strategy, including an 
integrated logistics support plan, a development strategy, and system design.  
Program planning has a significant subsequent impact on contract design which 
further influences contractor performance and ultimately organizational 
outcomes.   
Test and evaluation can have a major impact on ultimate 
technical/performance, cost and schedule.  The subjects indicated that the best 
way to ensure success was through robust modeling and simulation with 
sequentially increasing levels of fidelity to ensure the system is ready to perform 
before field tests are attempted.  Making sure that preliminary testing is adequate 
saves money and time in the long run by not having to repeat more expensive 
operational and live fire tests because of system failure. 
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Risk management was depicted by subjects B and C with 
double-headed arrows between cost, schedule, and technical/performance.  Risk 
can be defined as the potential inability to achieve overall program objectives 
within defined cost, schedule, and technical constraints (Naval Postgraduate 
School 2004) If there is no slack in either budget or schedule, and a program is 
under-performing technically, the possible outcomes that might achieve technical 
goals are an increase in cost or a delay in schedule.  Risk is continually 
assessed by the program manager to determine status of the program and 
forecast probability of future success. 
(3)  Inputs.  While all IWS 1.0 subjects recognized human 
capital as a basic input for their processes, subjects B and C recognized that the 
degree of technological maturity, the specificity of the system requirements, and 
the initial funding for any program were all important ingredients to ultimate 
success.   
It can generally be said that any organization will function 
better if managed and operated by highly qualified and trained personnel as 
opposed to lesser skilled manpower.   IWS 1.0 does not have significant levels of 
facilities and infrastructure; all the subjects recognized that the primary capital for 
IWS 1.0 resides in its people.  Hiring, motivating, and retaining their human 
capital will be critical to the long-term success of the organization. 
Mature and specific weapon system requirements are 
brought about by thorough, integrated analysis and they tend to eliminate 
ambiguity for the manufacturer.  Mature technology removes risk associated with 
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Figure 11.   Causal Performance Map – IWS 2.0 Composite 
 
b. IWS 2.0 
Figures 8 through 11 were derived from the interviews within IWS 
2.0, with Figure 11 being a composite map. 
(1)  Outcomes.  As in IWS 1.0 technical/performance, 
schedule and cost were all identified as common outcomes.  Subjects D and E 
also separated out supportability as a key outcome.  Subjects E and F identified 
the talent, growth and optimal deployment of the IWS 2.0 workforce.  Subject E 
was very focused on customer satisfaction, as well.   
Subject F brought out the importance of electronic warfare 
(EW) and radar operating in unison as an integrated system.  The thinking is that 
if EW systems can be well integrated into an air defense combat systems 
solution for the warfighter, the total system should have equal or greater combat  
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effectiveness at a lower total cost.  Much of the hypothetical savings would come 
from a need to procure and expend fewer surface-to-air missiles. 
Subject F also identified the importance of new project 
creation, where it made sense to the Navy as a whole.  Because of their work 
with the Fleet and industry, IWS 2.0 personnel are exposed to both the needs of 
Navy operators and emerging technologies within industry.  When they can 
marry the two efficiently and effectively through a new project it can be the best 
desired outcome for all, including tax payers.   
(2)  Processes.  Commonly recognized factors by all three 
IWS 2.0 subjects were communications, teamwork, contract design, program 
planning, T&E, and contractor performance.  Subject D identified financial 
management, thorough technical and program reviews and JCIDS requirements 
as additional determinants of organizational outcomes.  Subject F acknowledged 
the importance of regular and honest assessment, very similar to the review 
process mentioned by subject D.  Subject F also highlighted the risk 
management tradeoffs between technical/performance, cost and schedule, as 
well as the risk mitigation that can be derived from international cooperation.  
Lastly, subject F highlighted the process of comparing current system capability 
against available options for improvements to arrive at a more capable and/or 
cost effective weapon system solution.  The IWS 2.0 subjects shared many of the 
same processes with their IWS 1.0 counterparts, and to avoid redundancy, this 
commentary will be limited to any differences from what was discussed for IWS 
1.0.   
Teamwork took on a less prominent role in the IWS 2.0 
organization largely because the weapon systems that they work with do not 
combine inputs from other major programs within PEO IWS to the same extent 
that they do in IWS 1.0.  That is not to say that degree of integration was 
unimportant, but it was not as significant as mentioned for IWS 1.0.   
Contract design was an important aspect of IWS 2.0 
processes and an additional factor was mentioned, the need not only for  
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specificity, but for the elements of the contract to be measurable.  In order to hold 
parties to the contract accountable, and help determine contract awards, more 
measurable specific attributes are better. 
Risk management and its importance to organizational 
outcomes was emphasized by subject F.  Part of honestly assessing T&E 
progress and current system standing is comparison to the required scope 
covered in the requirements document.  If progress is not adequate, either due to 
cost, performance, or schedule considerations, trade-offs may be made to keep 
the product either on time, on budget or aimed at accomplishing 
technical/performance targets.   
The achievement of EW and radar integration would be 
influenced by acceptance of an EW system’s ability to detect and deceive 
perceived threats to the ships employing the system.  That acceptance would 
hinge greatly on the credibility of test results, to the extent that the ultimate user 
could trust and have confidence in them. 
International cooperation in weapon system design allows 
IWS 2.0 to leverage mature technologies and experience from other nations to 
create better or less risky solutions to solve fleet problems.  That cooperation can 
only take place in an environment of trust where ongoing dialogue exists.  The 
benefits of this interaction come from the different perspectives that different 
cultures might bring to the same problem.  New methods of solving perplexing 
problems have been gained in the past from altering the problem solver’s 
paradigm.   
New project creation is influenced by the aforementioned 
international cooperation, but also by keeping a keen eye on emerging 
technologies and assessing them against current systems.  Existing systems can 
become obsolete when the technology they employ is no longer supported by 
industry.  In that case, it would help the Fleet by ultimately improving 
effectiveness and system reliability for IWS 2.0 to nominate new technology 
solutions to the resource sponsor. 
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(3)  Inputs.  All three subjects agreed that human capital and 
mature system requirements were essential inputs that ultimately led to IWS 
2.0’s organizational outcomes.  Also, subjects D and F included contractor 
experience and past performance while subjects E and F mentioned 
technological maturity of the system as influential inputs.     
Contractor experience and past performance recognize that 
knowledge of the military acquisition process matters.  Contractors that have 
worked in the field previously should be able to better gauge what will be 
required to successfully produce for the military again.  Thus, their contract bids 
should be more accurate.  Regarding past performance, it could be a good 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The causal performance maps developed for IWS 1.0 and 2.0 provide a 
clear window into the operations of these two major programs and illuminate 
variables that help them achieve their desired outcomes.  Based on interview 
subject input and analysis of the maps, CPVs were chosen that capture the 
critical variables in achieving success. Those CPVs should answer the question, 
“Are we doing the right things?”  CPVs were analyzed to determine if they should 
have an input, process or output metric based on the criteria articulated in 
Chapter II.  The chosen performance metrics attempt to answer the question, 
“Are we doing the right things well?”  CPVs and metrics were then organized into 
a balanced scorecard framework aligned with PEO IWS and enterprise strategic 
goals.   
One thing that was evident from the causal performance maps was that 
IWS 1.0 and 2.0 have many inputs, processes and outputs in common.  They are 
similar organizations with similar aims.  Table 2 displays the inputs, processes 
and outcomes for both IWS 1.0 and 2.0 and then identifies those that are 
common to both.  The following analysis applies to both IWS 1.0 and 2.0 and is 
based on the list of common CPVs.   
It was apparent that success for both IWS 1.0 and 2.0 is influenced by 
more than just cost, schedule and technical performance.  To a great extent, 
these three outcomes define success for IWS 1.0 and 2.0, but they are not the 
only outcomes that will help IWS 1.0 and 2.0 contribute to their long-term goals.    
They are only lagging indicators of success.  Monitoring some of the leading 
CPVs should provide leading indicators of success or identify problems that 
require a manager’s preemptive action. Contained in the following analysis are 
potential performance metrics.  It is important to reiterate that these are 
recommendations only.  They are derived from the interviews, past research by 
other authors, strategic Navy documents, and the author’s experience.  It is rare 
that one person can individually determine valuable metrics for an organization, 
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and if a single person could, they would need to be intimately familiar with both 
the organization and its industry.  Typically, almost universally, good metrics 
development requires integrated input and analysis from throughout an 
organization.  The following suggested metrics should be viewed as 
recommendations for an organization-wide metrics process at PEO IWS, and as 
focus points for IWS 1.0 and 2.0 to consider when evaluating potential metrics for 
their major program areas.  Also, there are more CPVs and metrics listed here 
than IWS 1.0 or 2.0 will likely choose to implement.  The following list is drawn 
from the maps and intended to be a broad list that the major program managers 
can choose from or modify at their discretion.   
It appears that to just measure outcomes would leave a rich avenue of 
leadership influence without any guideposts to aid in decision making.  While 
many good managers and leaders intuitively emphasize all areas that influence 
strategic success, not all do.  Developing metrics for all areas of the strategy will 
ensure all parts of the strategy get management attention (Kaplan and Norton 
1996).  Additionally, it will communicate to all levels of IWS 1.0 and 2.0 what is 
viewed as important to the major program managers.  Providing a mix of leading 
and lagging indicators will provide managers with an ability to take action before 
outcomes are decided as well as measure those ultimate outcomes.   
The scorecard for IWS 1.0 and 2.0 displayed later in this chapter has been 
organized along the format put forth by Kaplan and Norton (1996).  The four 
classic perspectives of learning and growth, internal business processes, 
customer, and financial have been replaced with the strategic perspectives 
identified by PEO IWS.  The Kaplan and Norton perspectives are listed in 
parenthesis where they match with the more specific PEO IWS perspectives.   
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IWS 1.0 IWS 2.0 Common 
Inputs 
  Technology Maturity 
  Human Capital 
  Weapon System 




  Teamwork 
  Program Planning 
  Contract Design 
  Test and Eval 
  Contractor Performance 
  Communication 
  Human Capital  
    Development 
  Financial Management 
  FRP Surge Status 
  Ship Construction  
    Schedule 









  Customer Satisfaction 
  Schedule 
  Cost 
  Technical/Performance 
  Capability of IWS Team 
  Secure Funding 
Inputs 
  Technology Maturity 
  Human Capital Strategy 
  Weapon System  
    Requirements 
  Contractor Experience 
 
Processes 
  Teamwork 
  Planning 
  Contract Design 
  Test and Eval 
  Contractor Performance 
  Communication 
  Human Capital  
    Development and  
    Assessment 
  Financial Management 
  Review Process 
  Administration 
  Risk  
  International Cooperation
  Warfighter Tactical  
    Mindset 
  Assessment of Current  
    System vs. Future     
    Needs 
  Innovation 
 
Outcomes 
  Customer Satisfaction 
  Schedule 
  Cost 
  Technical/Performance 
  Talented Suitably  
    Deployed Workforce 
  Supportability 
  EW and Radar    
    Integration 
  New Project Creation 
 
Inputs 
  Technology Maturity 
  Human Capital 
  Weapon System 




  Teamwork 
  Planning 
  Contract Design 
  Test and Eval 
  Contractor Performance 
  Communication 
  Human Capital  
    Development 
  Financial Management 












  Customer Satisfaction 
  Schedule 
  Cost 
  Technical/Performance 
  Capability of IWS Team 
     (Talented Workforce) 
 
 
Table 2.   IWS 1.0 and 2.0 Common Critical Performance Variables 
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The scorecard organizes the metrics under perspectives which show their 
strategic alignment.  The four perspectives in IWS 1.0 and 2.0’s scorecard are 
aligned with NAVSEA and corporate Navy strategic objectives as depicted in 
Figure 3 and 4.  By then aligning organizational strategic objectives, CPVs, and 
metrics under those four perspectives, the users are able to see how their efforts, 
as measured through the metrics, can contribute to not only IWS 1.0 and 2.0 
success, but also PEO IWS, NAVSEA, and Navy strategic success.  That ability 
to tie disparate parts of the organization together, focus their energy on strategic 
goals, and provide relevance to employee efforts is one of the main benefits of a 
balanced scorecard and performance measurement system. 
As stated earlier, the list of metrics is longer than would likely be chosen to 
be monitored by IWS 1.0 and 2.0, but it is intended to serve as a list of possible 
metrics to choose from or modify.  Thus, the scorecard is spread across three 
figures in order to present all the potential metrics.  Any italicized CPVs and 
metrics were those that were identified only by IWS 2.0 subjects.  The boldfaced 
metrics are those that appear to be currently collected and utilized at IWS 1.0 
and 2.0.  Just because a metric is not boldfaced does not mean the data are not 
being accumulated, it merely means that they may not formally be reported to the 
major program managers.  The analysis as to what was currently being utilized 
by IWS 1.0 and 2.0 was somewhat subjective because much of what is currently 
monitored is done so informally.   
 
A. CRITICAL PERFORMANCE VARIABLES AND USEFUL METRICS 
The CPVs are inextricably linked together in a web of causal links, 
particularly human capital, communication and teamwork.  The causal maps 
bring this out by the web of lines between CPVs.  The spider web of links can be 
initially intimidating to the user, but persistence in evaluating the maps can bring 
insight into factors that impact IWS 1.0 and 2.0.  The following analysis is 
followed by a potential balanced scorecard for IWS 1.0 and 2.0 that lists possible  
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metrics for both major programs.  The following CPVs are arranged by balanced 
scorecard perspectives with IWS 2.0 specific CPVs discussed within the 
Programmatics perspective. 
1. Personnel 
a. Human Capital 
Human capital is critically important to the health and success of 
both IWS 1.0 and 2.0.  “People are our greatest asset,” is a commonly used 
adage in the Navy.  In fact, at IWS 1.0, the following statement is posted on one 
of the office doors, “It’s the PEOPLE, it’s the PEOPLE, it’s the PEOPLE.”  That 
sentiment is never truer than in a knowledge-based organization like PEO IWS.  
The keys to organizational success are contained within the people themselves 
in the form of their expertise and experience.  This was very apparent in the 
maps for both IWS 1.0 and 2.0.  Human capital ultimately affects all other 
outcomes. 
Any leadership pipeline has to begin with attracting employees, 
some of whom will become the future leadership within the organization.  Those 
employees need to be of sufficient quality that they can excel at their current jobs 
and learn new skills to move into areas of greater responsibility.  PEO IWS has a 
senior workforce, with over half of its 278 civilian employees at the GS-14 grade 
or higher.  It was apparent from interviewees’ comments that many of these 
workers will be eligible for retirement during the coming decade.  This is a long-
term problem with a long-term solution and PEO IWS must address this potential 
future human capital loss now in order to minimize loss in capability as the 
current workforce retires.  Largely due to budget pressures on manpower 
accounts, hiring is controlled at the NAVSEA level and is outside the major 
program manager’s direct control.  However, the major program manager must 
remain aware of the current manning situation in order to apply whatever 
pressure available to the chain of command to hire appropriate personnel.  It is 
unclear if the new National Security Personnel System will allow managers more 
direct control over hiring personnel.  One indicator of the health of the leadership  
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pipeline might be the number of interns working within IWS 1.0 and 2.0.  A large 
number of interns indicate that there are fresh, talented newcomers to replace 
retiring employees. 
One area of the human capital equation that is under the direct 
control of major program managers is development and motivation of existing 
personnel.  According to interviewees, skill and experience development through 
cross-training, broad exposure to new challenges and different varieties of 
program management, and attendance at training courses and professional 
seminars are long-term enablers of organizational success.  Although time 
consuming, constant improvement of workforce skills is necessary to leverage 
new technologies and to enable continuous improvement.  Mentoring by senior 
personnel is another aspect of development that can have good results (Fisher 
2005).  A good monitor for these activities is the development and review of 
individual leadership development plans (ILDP).  These are contracts between 
leaders and their subordinates that identify professional goals of the subordinates 
and needs of the organization.  They then focus on the skills that the 
subordinates need to attain or to improve their own standing and meet the needs 
of the organization.  ILDPs provide a methodology for improving the skill level of 
the employees, and a baseline for the manager to monitor the professional 
development of the subordinates.  ILDPs are used throughout IWS 1.0 and 2.0, 
but subsequent monitoring for achievement of goals has been individual 
manager dependent in the past. 
Retention of PEO IWS’s critical human capital is important to future 
success.  After the investment of time, funds, and energy in training and 
developing personnel, it is essential that these valuable employees be retained.  
Retention is enhanced by many things including the ability of employees to 
improve their skills, by monetary and non-monetary rewards, and promotions.  A 
good leading indicator of retention can be employee satisfaction.  Happy 
employees tend to stay on the job longer, and tend to produce better work results 
(Heskett, Sasser, and Schlesinger 1997).  An in-depth analysis of contributors to 
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employee satisfaction, through interviews or questionnaire, can contribute 
significantly to the managers understanding of the drivers behind retention. 
As demonstrated in recent efforts to focus the Navy budget on the 
recapitalization of ships and aircraft, reductions in manpower can be viewed as a 
means to free funds for higher priority needs.  Recent reductions in contractor 
support and hiring restrictions within NAVSEA organizations are good examples.  
While that may be the reality of the budget situation, accurate human capital 
metrics are needed to measure the impacts of those decisions.  Much like a 
building that requires consistent investment in maintenance to sustain itself over 
time, human capital needs consistent investment of time, money, and energy to 
continuously improve and meet organizational strategic goals.   
In a cost cutting environment, improving individual employee 
productivity is essential to sustaining or improving organizational effectiveness 
while maintaining or decreasing manpower costs.  There is a finite limit to which 
employee costs can be cut.  Improved employee commitment from a 
demonstration by IWS 1.0 and 2.0 to employee professional growth could have a 
positive impact of productivity. 
Human capital as an outcome aims to answer an important 
question, “Do we have the right number of properly skilled employees in the right 
jobs to succeed for the long-term?”  If the answer to that question is yes, then 
much of the other strategic goals of IWS 1.0 and 2.0 should be attainable.  A 
large part of ensuring people are in place for the long-term will be gauging their 
commitment to the organization.  It is not enough to have the right people now, 
there needs to be some confidence that they will be there in the future.  
Commitment of employees to the organization, along with their satisfaction and 
motivation will be key drivers of future retention (Fitz-enz 2000).  Additionally, a 
plan for what people will be needed in the long-term will be required.   
2. Programmatics 
It was apparent from the interviews that three primary variables have been 
the focus of performance metrics at PEO IWS and throughout the acquisition 
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community:  cost, schedule and technical/performance.  All but one of the 
interview subjects named these three variables as the most important factors to 
measure.  The programmatics perspective contains two of these variables:  cost 
and schedule.   
One useful method for analyzing a program’s progress towards 
completion is the Earned Value Management System (EVMS).  EVMS is a 
management tool that integrates cost, schedule and technical performance into 
one tracking system, and should provide excellent indicators of progress if 
reviewed regularly.  An EVMS tracking system is expensive for a contractor to 
set-up, and it is only required on cost or incentive contracts, subcontracts, intra-
government work agreements, and other agreements valued at or greater than 
20 million in then-year dollars.   
Earned value is the actual physical work completed on a project.  Cost 
performance index (CPI) compares the budgeted cost of work performed 
(BCWP) to the actual cost of work performed (ACWP).  
Cost Performance Index = BCWP / ACWP 
Cost variance (CV) is determined by subtracting ACWP from BCWP. 
Cost Variance = BCWP – ACWP  
Schedule performance index (SPI) compares the BCWP to budgeted cost for 
work scheduled (BCWS).   
Schedule Performance Index = BCWP / BCWS 
Schedule variance (SV) is determined by subtracting BCWS from BCWP. 
Schedule Variance = BCWP –  BCWS 
Together these indices and variances indicate actual cost and schedule relative 
to plan.  With variances, a positive value is favorable.  With the indices, a value 
greater than one is favorable.   
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The program manager variance at completion (PM VAC) and the 
contractor variance at completion (CONTR VAC) are the estimated total cost at 
contract completion minus total budgeted cost at contract completion.   
Thresholds are set above and below an established baseline to act as 
tripwires to cue leadership action.  They indicate to anyone who looks at the data 
whether the program is or is not performing to plan, whether unfavorable or 
favorable, and that analysis is required to determine the cause.   
Even when EVMS is not required, the basic logic should still be followed.  
An original baseline should be derived from which cost and schedule deviations 
can be observed and acted upon, if required. 
a. Cost 
Cost of a weapon system is an outcome of contractor performance 
and program management.  It is closely tied together with technical/performance 
and schedule.  Trade-offs between cost, schedule and performance lead to 
reductions or increases in their nominal values.  Indicators of cost performance 
are primarily delivered through EVMS and close communication with the 
contractor and Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR).  The use of EVMS is 
growing in the acquisition community with its use required at lower total contract 
values than previously mandated. 
b. Schedule 
Schedule is influenced by many variables and tracking any of those 
should be indicative of future schedule slippage.  Funding, cost, technical 
performance, employee competency, contractor performance, contract design, 
and T&E can all influence schedules.  Also, changes in the external factors 
beyond the program manager’s control can have a large impact such as ship 
delivery schedule and availability of ships due to operational “surge” 
requirements.   
c. Test and Evaluation 
The T&E process is a good indicator of program success.  Because 
of the iterative process of T&E, from less to more demanding testing, each 
separate phase provides an opportunity to evaluate the current and potential 
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success of the program.  The Defense Acquisition Guidebook outlines 
Development, Test, and Evaluation best practices and provides some ideas for 
potential leading metrics for T&E and program success.  These metrics are 
depicted in the proposed balanced scorecard. 
d. Risk Management 
Managing risk is one of the essential tasks of program 
management.  A risk management strategy is determined, usually by an 
integrated team, and published in a Risk Management Plan.  A level of risk can 
be assigned to any event or outcome, but it is of primary concern in program 
management at PEO IWS in terms of cost, schedule, performance, and funding 
risk. 
 One common method to determine risk is by a risk rating matrix.  A 
generic risk rating matrix is depicted in Figure 12.  Risk events are decomposed 
into likelihood and consequences.  Likelihood is stated as an adjective describing 
the probability of occurrence, either remote, unlikely, likely, highly likely, or near 
certainty.  Consequences are described by potential program impact if a risk 
event were to occur, either minimal/none, slight, moderate, significant, or 
unacceptable.  A risk rating is then assigned by plotting the risk likelihood on the 
vertical axis of a chart and risk consequences on the horizontal axis.  The 
intersection of the likelihood and consequences in the chart are the risk rating.  In 




































Figure 12.   Risk Rating Matrix (From: Naval Postgraduate School 2005) 
 
At a minimum, a subjective risk assessment should be executed by 
the program manager based on experience and an assessment of what is known 
about program variables and the external program environment.  Objectivity 
would be preferred over subjectivity, in most cases.  One method of making a 
more objective determination is by assigning specific definitions to the adjective 
ratings for likelihood and consequences that are then used universally throughout 
the program.  The benefits might include better trend analysis over time and a 
reduction in bias of the subjective risk rating.  The risk rating can be used by the 
major program manager to track risk in his or her many programs.   
Risk must be tracked systematically during the acquisition process 
(Naval Postgraduate School 2004).  Key events can be utilized to measure risk.  
T&E events serve as good points to monitor and reassess risk.  Performance, 
cost, and schedule progress can be compared against a pre-established baseline 
to evaluate probability of attaining ultimate program goals within predefined 
constraints.   
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The Earned Value Management provides an excellent risk 
indicator.  At any given point in system development, cost and schedule 
execution can be compared to the baseline to determine current status, and 
future status can be forecast.  Risk can be determined from current progress 
relative to baseline.    
e. Communication 
Communication can be the glue that holds an organization together 
and keeps its different parts moving forward together.  Interview subjects 
emphasized the importance of communication to their staying abreast of the 
health of their programs and in building relationships which were essential to 
good program management.  From the maps it is evident that communication 
effectiveness has impacts throughout the other processes and outcomes.  As 
stated earlier, neither IWS 1.0 nor 2.0 produces the systems that they are 
responsible for providing to the Fleet.  They add value to the Navy by expertly 
managing the acquisition and support of those systems.  To provide that value 
they must coordinate their activities both internally and externally and gather and 
disperse information to all stakeholders.   
Effective communication can be the key to organizational success.  
In one study, researchers concluded that the benefits obtained from quality 
internal communications included: 
• improved productivity, 
• reduced absenteeism, 
• higher quality of services and products, 
• increased levels of innovation, 
• fewer strikes, and 
• reduced costs (Clampitt and Downs 1993). 
Another researcher commented, “The manager does not leave meetings or hang 
up the telephone in order to get back to work.  In large part, communication is his 
or her work (Mintzberg 1989).”   
It can be very difficult to monitor the inputs to and process of 
communication.  One measure of an input to communication might be the 
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robustness and quality of the information exchange network, including 
databases, email and telephones.  One of the characteristics of a good 
performance metric is that it be within the ability of the manager to influence.  
With the advent of the Navy’s enterprise-wide intranet service, the flexibility of the 
major program manager to influence communications hardware and software has 
been curtailed, thus this may not be the most useful metric.   
A better focus for a measure might be the outcomes of the 
communication process.  Many of the outcomes are measurable during the many 
reviews that an acquisition program must go through during its development and 
ultimate fielding.  These incremental reviews give indications as to the progress 
of a program.  It is evident from the causal performance maps that 
communication can cause adverse effects to that progress.  One way to prepare 
for reviews might be for the program manager to ask him or herself, “What 
problems could poor communication cause on this program,” and then look for 
those problems (Hargie and Tourish 2000).  If the program is not making desired 
progress then communications might be one of the contributing factors.  The 
program manager must make a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of 
communication at that time, if not before.  A leading indicator might be frequency 
of interactions with stakeholders in a process.    
One periodic and effective method of measuring communications 
effectiveness is via a communications audit.  The audit can measure or identify 
quality of information communicated, quality of communication relationships, 
organizational communication networks, and bottlenecks in existing networks.  
The audit can give a clearer picture about what is happening in an organization 
compared to what leadership might think is happening (Hurst 1991).  This audit is 
best done via questionnaires or interviews.  The least time intensive, most 
anonymous, and best method for trend analysis and benchmark comparisons 
tends to be with questionnaires (Hargie and Tourish 2000).  The audit can help 
identify if communications are flowing fluidly inside and outside the organization 
and locate points that are acting to impede communications flow.  One outcome 
of this process might be to identify communications training that can help the 
52 
organization communicate more effectively.  Other benefits might be to recognize 
an inefficient organizational structure or to identify needed communications 
infrastructure improvements.   
Another more subjective method could be to emphasize the 
importance of communication to employees and subsequent review of their 
performance in that area during annual individual performance reviews.  What 
gets emphasized daily and during reviews is hopefully where employees will 
maximize their efforts.  Additionally, some amount of monetary awards can be 
dedicated to rewarding employees who display effective communication as 
measured in communication audits, or other methods.    
Communication is the basis for relationships and international 
cooperation.  The amount of cooperative weapon systems development with 
allies could be an indicator of communication’s effectiveness, assuming an 
ongoing effort for international engagement exists.  
f. Teamwork 
Teamwork is especially important for IWS 1.0 because of its focus 
on integrated combat systems.  It is very difficult to build an integrated system 
without sound teamwork.  IWS 1.0 integrates the work of multiple major 
programs into a fully combat-capable system.  The AEGIS radar is a good 
example.  IWS 1.0 handles the combat system while IWS 2.0 handles the radar 
hardware portion of the system.  Without close coordination and teamwork, the 
final combat system will not function as well as envisioned, if at all.  The 
composite maps for both IWS 1.0 and 2.0 show the ultimate affects of teamwork 
on the outcomes of the organizations.  For IWS 1.0 it influences all but 
development of human capital, and for IWS 2.0 it has equally significant impacts.   
Like communication, teamwork can be difficult to objectively and 
quantifiably measure at the input or process stage.  One useful point of 
measurement might be the degree of stakeholder participation in regular program 
meetings.  Those stakeholders would include but are not limited to other program 
managers that are involved in development of a particular combat system, 
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weapon system contractors, resource sponsors, T&E personnel, and Fleet 
representatives.  Teamwork is the key to the IPPD process.  Strong teamwork 
and a multi-disciplinary approach, started at the beginning of a program’s 
conception and development, should improve chances of success and decrease 
total life cycle cost of a weapon system (Department of Defense 2005a). 
How well integrated a program is should be evident from the 
previously mentioned communication audits.  It is difficult to be integrated without 
effective and regular communication.  If the communication audit indicated that a 
key member of a system development team was working in isolation that might 
be a good indicator of future problems and an area for management action. 
Planning reviews and preparations for them are good points for 
manager evaluation of the degree of teamwork on a program.  The manager 
should be able to gauge the degree of internal and external coordination by the 
review.  One of the key IPPD tenets is multidisciplinary teamwork through 
Integrated Product Teams (Department of Defense 2005a).  A determination of 
how well the IPPD principles are being followed could be one of the take-aways 
from a review.    
Sharing of award incentives could motivate teamwork amongst both 
PEO IWS employees and contractors.  In order for anyone to collect award fees 
or personal reward incentives, the entire team must meet its goals.  This could 
hopefully foster teamwork since all would have an incentive to help each other 
succeed. 
T&E can provide a lagging indicator of how well integrated a 
program is.  If the separate parts that make up a system have not been designed 
and assembled in a coordinated fashion, with good teamwork between all 
concerned, then the results of T&E will most likely be below expectations.    
g. Contractor Performance 
By the nature of the business, contractor performance is critical to 
the success of any acquisition program.  From the causal maps it is relatively 
easy to see that contractor performance impacts technical/performance, cost and 
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schedule.  Regardless of the expertise of the program manager, if the contractor 
does not adequately perform, despite the program manager’s best efforts, the 
program will not succeed.  That said, the best way for the program manager to 
specifically monitor contractor performance is through frequent and precise 
communication, and a close relationship with the COR and the contractor team.  
Frequent and honest assessments are essential, as is an accurate EVMS 
appraisal at regular intervals.   
Contractor performance must be evaluated for its impact on system 
cost, schedule, and technical/performance.  EVMS allows that evaluation.  EVMS 
data is frequently at least 30 days out of date by the time it reaches a program 
manager.  Close coordination with the contractor and the COR allows the 
program manager to get up to date information when required.   
When used properly, EVM allows government and contractor 
program managers visibility into technical, cost and schedule 
planning, performance and progress on their contracts.  This 
visibility provides not only insight to contract performance, but 
provides data points to statistically estimate completion costs 
(Department of Defense 2005b). 
EVMS has been a part of program management for 37 years and is 
well understood in the acquisition community.  The recent reduction in threshold 
for implementation of EVMS from certain contracts valued at greater than 73 
million dollars to those valued at greater than 20 million dollars appears to be 
indicative of its perceived value as a tracking tool for program health.   
h. Contract Design 
Contract design can have a large impact on contractor 
performance, cost and schedule.  If insufficient risk is borne by the contractor, 
there may be a reduced incentive to deliver on time and on budget.  Specificity of 
terms within the contract seems to be of significant importance.  Additionally, 
team incentives might prove useful in generating teamwork among contractors.    
i. Planning 
The old saying goes, “Prior planning prevents poor performance.”  
That is as true in acquisition as in other endeavors.  An integrated and 
55 
comprehensive planning process can lead to excellent results.  Time invested at 
the beginning of the process should pay dividends at the end by minimizing 
rework.  The review and decision point processes within the acquisition 
framework provide adequate opportunities to gauge the robustness of planning 
and strategy development.  A lagging indicator might be the historic accuracy of 
planned cost and schedule performance for IWS 1.0 and 2.0.  Continuously 
improving accuracy might be indicative of accurate planning and forecasting.   
j. Contractor Past Performance 
Contractor past performance can be an indicator of future 
performance and can act as a leading indicator of success.  It can be evaluated 
using the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS).  A 
possible metric might relate the total number of contracts within a major program 
area to number of contracts with contractors that have received favorable 
average past performance ratings.   
k. Technology Maturity 
The maturity of required technology can be accurately gauged via 
technology readiness assessments.  It is the primary initial indicator of risk.  If the 
system requires yet to be developed technology, that would be indicative of high 
risk.  That risk will ultimately help determine contract design and impact 
acquisition strategy.   
l. IWS 2.0 Specific CPVs 
(1) International Cooperation.  International cooperation was 
deemed important in IWS 2.0 by subject F.  It is enhanced through strong 
relationships and regular communication.  It acts to mitigate risk and stimulate 
new program creation by allowing access to technology that might be superior to 
that available from U.S. defense contractors.  Even if not superior, the different 
perspectives regarding system design and development found amongst our allies 
might offer innovative solutions.   
(2)  EW and Radar Integration.  EW and radar integration is 
a goal for IWS 2.0 focused on getting more combat effectiveness by maximizing 
the benefits that both EW and radar can bring to the warfighter.  From the 
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interviews it was evident that the effort needs to focus on getting the warfighter to 
have confidence in the EW system’s ability to detect and deceive a threat.  That 
goal can be achieved through T&E and Fleet exercises and subsequent active 
communication of those results to the Fleet in order to engender confidence.   
(3)  New Project Creation.  New project creation for its own 
sake is not the goal that IWS 2.0 is after.  The interview subjects indicated that it 
is only in improving Fleet readiness in a cost effective manner that new projects 
make sense.  The need for and creation of new projects is influenced by 
international cooperation and innovative employee ideas.  IWS 2.0 has access to 
knowledge concerning cutting-edge technology and allied weapon development 
efforts.  By maintaining and enhancing ties to allies and industry, they can derive 
innovative ways to improve Fleet weapon systems.   
3. Fleet Readiness 
a. Technical/Performance 
Operating as designed and meeting key performance parameters 
(KPP) as laid out in requirements are essential outcomes in weapons acquisition.  
All six interview subjects identified this along with cost and schedule as key 
outcomes that defined success.  Performance is primarily evaluated via T&E.  
System performance is compared against key performance parameters and 
specific test criteria to evaluate system readiness to proceed to the next level of 
testing and ultimately on to Fleet introduction.   
b. Supportability 
IWS 2.0 personnel specifically identified supportability as an area of 
concern and a critical performance variable.  It seems that financial support for 
training and technical manuals is one of the easier items to reduce if there are 
cost overruns on a program.  Supportability is more than just technical manuals 
and also includes a good plan to keep the systems operating at full potential.  
IWS 1.0 interview subjects included supportability as a subset of 
technical/performance.  The metrics in the balanced scorecard are germane to 
both major programs. 
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c. Customer Satisfaction  
Customer satisfaction is the ultimate test of the acquisition system.  
If the Fleet gets the weapon systems it needs to fight and win, and is satisfied 
with the reliability, usability, supportability, effectiveness, and cost, then PEO 
IWS 1.0 and 2.0 will most likely consider their efforts a success.  Communication 
plays a role in satisfaction.  The ultimate user needs to have an expectation 
regarding a new system.  System function will be judged against that 
expectation.  If there is no communication between the acquisition community 
and the Fleet concerning a new system’s use and capabilities, then there is likely 
to be a misguided expectation as well as lower acceptance of the new system.  
This expectation can also be influenced by the amount of involvement in system 
planning by Fleet personnel.  The more involvement, the more likely that Fleet 
needs will be identified and incorporated, positively impacting ultimate 
satisfaction.     
Another useful tool to measure customer satisfaction would be a 
customer satisfaction survey.  Additionally, weapon systems instructors and field 
engineering activities that respond to system casualty reports (CASREPS) would 
be a useful and knowledgeable survey audience to get a feel for Fleet 
satisfaction with IWS 1.0 and 2.0 efforts.   
4. Business 
a. Financial Management/Funding 
Money, in the form of funding, provides the grease that keeps the 
acquisition machine running.  Sufficiency of funding and appropriate 
management of those funds impact cost, schedule and technical/performance.  
Financial management is impacted by the expertise of the personnel that are 
managing the funds, effectiveness of communication, teamwork, and planning.  
Some key metrics for financial management effectiveness are listed below. 
Maintenance of funding across the FYDP is vital to program 
schedule and cost maintenance, as well as meeting technical/performance 
requirements.  Program strategies and contract execution are all dependent on 
maintaining planned funding.  The best metric to use for monitoring funding 
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overtime is tracking rescissions and reductions to a budget.  The best leading 
indicator of threats to program outcomes is the difference between estimated 
funding required and funding currently programmed.  
 
B. BALANCED SCORECARD 
The performance metrics suggested in the Proposed Balanced 
Scorecards (Tables 3-5) may be currently useful for IWS 1.0 and 2.0, but they 
need to be flexible over time for multiple reasons.  First, as the strategic 
environment changes, IWS 1.0 and 2.0 will need to change and adjust in order to 
continue to improve and succeed.  The performance metrics may need to change 
as well, since they should be a reflection of the organizational strategy.   
Second, organizations learn to maximize performance relative to 
metrics.  That was one reason to communicate metrics throughout an 
organization -- to influence employee behavior.  While maximizing what is 
measured, other parts of the strategy may be neglected, or other measurable 
aspects of the CPVs and outcomes may be ignored.   
Third, performance metrics may cause unintended dysfunctional 
behavior by employees trying to maximize performance relative to the metrics.  
For those reasons and probably more, the performance metrics should be refined 
regularly to ensure they are still capturing relevant information for achieving the 
organizations strategic goals.  The result of that review is hopefully a zero sum 
evolution.  If any measures are added, others should be taken out, so that a sort 
of metrics overload does not take hold; measures should be prioritized for value 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There is an obvious need for performance measurement in Navy 
commands.  It is required by statute and desirable from a leadership standpoint.  
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate a methodology for arriving at 
performance metrics, in this case for IWS 1.0 and 2.0.  First, performance drivers 
were captured for IWS 1.0 and 2.0 via interviews with key leaders in those two 
major programs.  Those interviews were transformed into causal performance 
maps which depicted the interplay of the drivers and the outcomes they 
influence.  Performance metrics were then derived for the drivers and outcomes 
and arranged in a balanced scorecard format.  The scorecard may be useful to 
the major program managers in monitoring the progress of their organizations at 
achieving strategic goals.  Additionally, the metrics should enhance 
understanding of strategic direction by the rank and file of IWS 1.0 and 2.0 if they 
are openly discussed and analyzed. 
 
B. BALANCED PERSPECTIVE 
It was evident from the interviews and the causal performance maps that 
there are many diverse factors that impact strategic organizational success for 
IWS 1.0 and 2.0.  Those factors are under the influence of the major program 
managers to varying degrees.  The performance metrics must attempt to 
measure across the four balanced scorecard perspectives for IWS 1.0 and 2.0, 
not just programmatics and Fleet readiness, if they are to adequately support 
progress toward long-term goal achievement.  
 
C. PEO IWS IS ON THE RIGHT TRACK 
PEO IWS recognized at the outset of FY 2005 that it needed to improve its 
human capital strategy, horizontal integration, and performance metrics.  
Currently, the command has an active human capital strategy team that is further 
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developing and refining its human capital strategy.  PEO IWS has also created a 
horizontal integration team to improve organizational efficiency by identifying 
redundant functions as well as areas that they can leverage organizational 
synergy to improve productivity.  A performance metrics integrated product team 
is also actively pursuing PEO level metrics to better focus the organization’s 
energy and measure results.  They have leveraged expert facilitators to help 
achieve success in all three areas.  Interestingly, this thesis recognized similar 
areas for improvement, but arrived at that conclusion by a completely different 
methodology.  The three main areas for metrics improvement recognized by this 
research are human capital, teamwork (integration), and communication.  These 
can also be the hardest areas to measure because of the difficulty in objectively 
quantifying performance in those areas, particularly in teamwork and 
communication.     
As part of NAVSEA, PEO IWS was involved in an assessment by 
GENESYS Corporation regarding organizational alignment.  The survey gave 
insight to the major program managers in six areas:  Mission, Service, People, 
Processes, SEA POWER 21 and Transformation Framework.  Each of the six 
factors could be further divided for analysis.  People could be divided into 
Supervision; NAVSEA Leadership (Flag/SES); Job Skills & Knowledge; 
Performance Accountability; and Motivational Energy.   The information was 
presented in such a way that users could determine how well aligned the 
employee and leadership perspectives were within the command.  If it was 
apparent that there was poor alignment with leadership’s goals then that might 
indicate the need for deeper investigation to determine the reasons for 
misalignment and an appropriate courses of action.  At a minimum the survey 
might be used for trend analysis by the major program managers. It could 






D. VALUE OF METHODOLOGY TO THE NAVY 
The methodology used in this thesis, ethnographic interview and causal 
map creation, are an effective way to derive CPVs for an organization, and can 
provide a valuable starting point for a performance metric working group.  As 
stated earlier, the best and most viable performance metrics usually come from a 
group effort within an organization.  Selection of interview subjects is important 
so that the mapping process leverages tacit knowledge of individuals who know 
how the organization truly functions at both a strategic and tactical level.  The 
presentation of the map to a metrics working group would be an excellent place 
to start that group’s discussions.  The group’s time could be more efficiently 
spent working from the CPVs and outcomes identified by the causal performance 
map, or from a balanced scorecard or similar display of potential metrics.  Large 
groups sometimes have difficulty agreeing on an initial framework and direction.  
The work done in arriving at CPVs should provide an initial framework for 
working group efforts and jump start the group toward a successful outcome.   
The use of the causal map to derive performance metrics without the input 
of a stakeholder group is not recommended.  The resulting metrics are potentially 
subjective and run a very great risk of missing an important element of the CPVs 
and outcomes.   
 
E. POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Analysis of the success of a performance measurement system in a 
command that has recently reinvigorated its metrics might prove useful.  There 
are currently many Navy commands revitalizing their measurement systems, just 
like PEO IWS.  These commands provide opportunity for future analysis. 
• Which methods for deriving metrics work best? 
• Which specific metrics and types of metrics were least expensive to 
implement and track, both in time and money? 
• What types of metrics were most useful to leaders and managers? 
• Is there a measurable difference in performance before and after 
the implementation of the new performance metrics? 
66 
The Navy is operating in a long-term environment of fiscal constraint.  
There will continue to be a push for improved efficiency and effectiveness.  Any 
research that can help commands make measurable improvements will be useful 
to Navy leaders. 
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